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May Congress Grant the States the Power to Violate the
Equal Protection Clause? Aliessa v. Novello and Title IV
of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996
I. INTRODUCTION
“All of our people all over the country—except the pure-blooded
Indian are immigrants or descendants of immigrants, including even
those who came over here on the Mayflower.”1 The United States has a
rich immigrant heritage. Throughout its history, its doors (and borders)
have been open to immigrants and those searching for a new way of life.
However, in 1996, Congress disregarded this rich heritage and enacted
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(“PRWORA”). PRWORA was designed to “end welfare as we know it”2
as well as to curb welfare’s effect as an “incentive for immigration to the
United States.”3
The Act has met its goals. It has dramatically changed the face of
welfare and has had far-reaching effects on the United States immigrant
population. In its effort to eliminate welfare as an incentive for
immigration, however, Congress delegated many of its immigration and
naturalization powers to the states. But can Congress transfer these
powers to the states? This was the issue facing the New York Court of
Appeals in Aliessa v. Novello.4 In a unanimous decision, the court took
the road not traveled and held that in enacting Title IV of PRWORA,
Congress went beyond its authority by placing critical immigration
policy powers into the hands of the states. In taking on this issue,
“Aliessa v. Novello . . . marks the first state high court decision
addressing whether Congress can, in the context of welfare reform,

1. Aliessa v. Whalen, 694 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (quoting JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 973 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968)), rev’d sub nom., Aliessa v.
Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001).
2. Steven M. Dawson, The Promise of Opportunity—and Very Little More: An Analysis of
the New Welfare Law’s Denial of Federal Public Benefits to Most Legal Immigrants, 41 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 1053, 1066 (1997).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(B) (2000).
4. 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001).
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confer on states the authority to determine whether certain classes of
legal aliens are eligible for Medicaid.”5
Was the New York Court of Appeals correct in deciding that
Congress could not devolve this power to the states? If so, the court’s
decision could impact other states’ laws enacted as a response to
PRWORA as well as PRWORA itself. This Note focuses on that issue
and explores the legal background and arguments on which the New
York Court of Appeals based its decision. This Note begins with a brief
overview of the Medicaid system as well as an overview of PRWORA
and Title IV of that Act, which contains the immigration provisions. Part
III briefly details the factual and procedural history of the Aliessa case.
Part IV examines the court’s analysis by first reviewing the court’s
determination that the New York Social Security Act section 122, which
was enacted in response to PRWORA, violated New York’s
Constitution. It then turns to the court’s analysis of Congress’s ability to
devolve their immigration policy powers (and thereby effectively grant
virtual immunity from strict scrutiny) to the states, wherein the court
determined that this power could not be devolved to the states. This
analysis will also discuss other arguments available to the court and
whether its conclusions were correct. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the issues facing the New York Court of Appeals, it is
imperative to generally understand the Medicaid system, PRWORA and
the reasons for its enactment, and New York’s response to PRWORA.
This section, therefore, gives a brief overview of each area contributing
to the court’s decision.
A. The Medicaid System
Congress enacted the Medicaid system in 1965.6 It is the basic
system for providing for the medical needs of indigent Americans.7 The
system consists of both federal and state spending to finance special
health care programs.8 Under this complex scheme, the “Federal
5. John Caher, Legal Resident Aliens Win Medicaid Dispute; Statute Violated Federal and
State Constitutions, 225 N.Y. L. J. 108, June 6, 2001, at 1.
6. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Title 42 of the United States Code); see also Atkins v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 154, 156 (1986). For a more detailed overview of the Medicare system including its history and
structure, see LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF MEDICARE: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR POLICY (Mark V. Pauly & William L. Kissick eds., 1988).
7. William Alvarado Rivera, A Future for Medicaid Managed Care: The Lessons of
California’s San Mateo County, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 107 (1995–96).
8. Dawson, supra note 2, at 1057.
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Government shares the costs of Medicaid with States that elect to
participate in the program.”9 For states to receive the federal grants,
however, they must follow evolving federal guidelines and procedures,
which is what many states, including New York, did after Congress
enacted PRWORA.10 Prior to 1996, states were allowed to extend state
benefits, at the states’ own cost, to both qualified and unqualified
aliens.11 But this changed with the enactment of PRWORA.
B. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (“PRWORA”) was enacted in 1996 in order to “create a system in
which society has less responsibility for the poverty-stricken by focusing
on increased personal responsibility—a shift from welfare to
workfare.”12 The Act was designed to “break the cycle of welfare
dependency among the poor by severely restricting eligibility for federal
benefits and instituting workplace-oriented reforms that would promote
individual self-reliance.”13
With this proposed reform, the Act was estimated to save the federal
government over $54 billion in the first six years.14 Because noncitizen
welfare expenditures were estimated to amount to forty-four percent of
the estimated federal savings and were perceived to be an incentive for
immigration into the United States, the Act aimed to restrict welfare
benefits to noncitizens specifically.15 To this end, Congress enacted Title
IV of PRWORA, which directly addressed the issue of aliens (both legal
and illegal) and their eligibility for welfare benefits. In drafting this Title,
Congress cited numerous reasons for the restrictions on immigrant
benefits including increasing self-sufficiency16 and remedying the
eligibility rules which had “proved wholly incapable of assuring that

9. Atkins, 477 U.S. at 156-57.
10. Id; Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (N.Y. 2001).
11. John Fredriksson, Bridging the Gap Between Rights and Responsibilities: Policy
Changes Affecting Refugees and Immigrants in the United States Since 1996, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
757, 766 (2000).
12. Dixie R. Switzer, Comment, Welfare Reform: Oregon’s Response to the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 77 OR. L. REV. 759, 760 (1998).
13. John. P. Collins, Jr., Developments in Policy: Welfare Reform, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
221, 221 (1997).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 761; 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(B) (2000).
16. Self-sufficiency has been a “basic principle of United States immigration law since [the]
country’s earliest immigration statutes.” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1), (4).
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individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.”17 Title IV was
directly at issue in Aliessa.
In establishing the restrictions on welfare benefits for aliens, Title IV
created two different categories of aliens: qualified and non-qualified.
The “qualified aliens” category covers only a short list of legal aliens in
the United States.18 All other aliens that do not fit into the small category
of qualified aliens, including those aliens permanently residing in the
United States under color of law (“PRUCOLs”), fall into the nonqualified alien category and are not eligible for federal welfare benefits.19
Yet even qualified aliens are not automatically eligible for federal
Medicaid. Instead, they are further broken down into two subcategories:
(1) those lawfully residing in the United States prior to August 22, 1996
and (2) those entering on or after August 22, 1996.20 Those in the second

17. Id. The stated reasons for enacting Title IV are listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1601:
The Congress makes the following statements concerning national policy with respect to
welfare and immigration:
(1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since
this country’s earliest immigration statutes.
(2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that
(A) aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their
needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their
sponsors, and private organizations, and
(B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the
United States.
(3) Despite the principle of self-sufficiency, aliens have been applying for and receiving
public benefits from Federal, State, and local governments at increasing rates.
(4) Current eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial support
agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens not burden
the public benefits system.
(5) It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility and
sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with
national immigration policy.
(6) It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.
(7) With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning the eligibility
of qualified aliens for public benefits in this title, a State that chooses to follow the
Federal classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens for public assistance
shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the
compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance
with national immigration policy.
Id.
18. See id. § 1641(b) (1997). The list of qualified aliens included “aliens who are lawfully
admitted for permanent residence (generally green card holders), granted asylum, designated
refugees, paroled into the United States for at least one year, having their deportation withheld,
granted conditional entry, Cuban and Haitian entrants or victims of battering or extreme cruelty by a
spouse or other family member.” Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1091 (2001); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1641(b).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000).
20. Id. §§ 1612–1613 (2000). Because of controversy surrounding Title IV, some
amendments to the title were enacted as part of the Balanced Budget Act. Collins, supra note 13, at
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group of qualified aliens are largely ineligible for Medicaid and other
federal benefits for at least five years after becoming a legal alien.21
In addition to dictating new eligibility requirements for federal
welfare, Title IV also addressed state and local welfare benefits. In
general, non-qualified aliens—many of whom are legal aliens—are not
eligible for state and local benefits.22 The only health benefits they are
eligible for are emergency medical assistance, emergency disaster relief,
and immunizations.23 Although non-qualified aliens are ineligible for
most benefits, under Title IV Congress did grant states the discretion to
extend these benefits to those aliens.24 The states, naturally, will carry the
financial responsibility of these affirmative grants. Yet, as Congress
granted the states the power to extend benefits to ineligible aliens, it also
granted the states the power to deny state benefits to those qualified
aliens who would otherwise be eligible.25 In this way, Congress also
granted the states the power to discriminate based on alienage.
C. New York’s Response to PRWORA
Many states “feared that as a result of the diminished federal funds
the states would have to spend more to provide medical care for indigent
immigrants” 26 and adopted Title IV federal classifications into their state
medical assistance policies. New York, with one of the largest
populations of immigrants residing in its jurisdiction, was one of those
states. New York incorporated the federal classifications into its laws and
limited state-funded benefits to immigrants.27 This enactment, which was

225–26. These changes, however, mostly affected the aliens falling into the qualified aliens residing
lawfully in the United States prior to August 22, 1996 category. Id.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a).
22. See id. § 1621(a), (c)(1) (2000).
23. Id. § 1621(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3) (2000).
24. This can be done “only through the enactment of State law . . . which affirmatively
provides for such eligibility” to those ineligible aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).
25. Id. § 1622(a), (b) (1997). Section 1622 (b) provides exceptions to this power to revoke
eligibility for qualified aliens including 1) a time-limited exception for refugees and aliens, 2) certain
permanent resident aliens, 3) veterans and aliens on active duty, and 4) those aliens transitioning
from receiving benefits to becoming ineligible for benefits. Id. § 1622(b).
26. Victoria Rivkin, Judge Nullifies Limits on Immigrant Benefits; Law Denying Medicaid
Held Unconstitutional, 221 N.Y. L. J. 95, May 19, 1999, at 1.
27. N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 122 (2001). This section provides that “no person except a citizen or
an alien who has been duly naturalized as a citizen shall be eligible . . . for additional state payments
for aged, blind and disabled persons, family assistance, safety net assistance, services funded under
title XX of the federal social security act, or medical assistance.” Id. Section 122 does provide the
same exceptions as provided for by the PRWORA, as well as an exception for aliens who were
lawfully residing in the United States under the color of law and who were diagnosed with AIDS and
were receiving medical assistance. Id. § 122(1)(a), (b), (c).
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in direct response to PRWORA, appeared to be in line with the Act. In
fact, Congress noted:
With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning
the eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in this chapter, a
State that chooses to follow the Federal classifications in determining
the eligibility of such aliens for public assistance shall be considered to
have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the
compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant
in accordance with national immigration policy.28

Therefore, by denying state benefits to non-qualified aliens and even to
otherwise eligible aliens, New York was only following the dictates of
Congress.
Prior to PRWORA, New York had “provided State Medicaid to
needy recipients without distinguishing between legal aliens and citizens.
It ceased to do so, however, after Congress enacted the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.”29
With this change in state law, New York was free to deny benefits to
individuals based on alienage.
III. ALIESSA V. NOVELLO
A. The Facts
As detailed above, shortly after the passage of PRWORA, New York
enacted section 122 of the New York Social Services Act, thereby
limiting state-funded welfare benefits to many immigrants lawfully
residing in New York. The twelve plaintiffs fell into the new
“unqualified alien” category. These individuals immigrated to the United
States from such countries as “Bangladesh, Belorussia, Ecuador, Greece,
Guyana, Haiti, Italy, Malaysia, the Philippines, Syria and Turkey.”30
Each suffered from severe medical ailments and, prior to the enactment
of section 122, each would have allegedly qualified “for Medicaid
benefits funded solely by the State.”31 However, their alien status made
them ineligible for state-funded welfare benefits.32 Furthermore, their
medical conditions did not fall into the “emergency medical treatment”

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (2000).
Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1089–90 (N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id.
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exception; yet, each condition, although not technically an emergency,
was potentially life threatening.33
Seeking an injunction, these twelve immigrants alleged that the New
York Social Services Law section 122 violated the Equal Protection
Clauses of both the United States and New York State Constitutions.34
They also alleged that section 122 violated article XVII, section 1 of the
New York State Constitution requiring “the State to provide aid, care and
support for the needy.”35
B. Procedural History
The twelve plaintiffs filed a class action against the commissioner.
The proposed class action represented “[a]ll Lawful Permanent Residents
who entered the United States on or after . . . [August] . . . 22, 1996 and
all Persons Residing [in the United States] Under Color of Law
(PRUCOLs) who, but for the operation of New York Social Services
Law section 122, would be eligible for Medicaid coverage in New York
State.”36 They initially filed for a declaratory judgment seeking a
declaration that the state’s policy denying plaintiffs’ medical benefits
based solely on their immigration status was unlawful.37 They also
sought an injunction of the policy as well as reimbursement for the
denied benefits.38
The Supreme Court of Manhattan granted the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment finding that the New York Social Services Law
section 122 violated both the New York constitutional mandate to
support the needy as well as the Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States and New York State Constitutions.39 In finding that section 122
violated the Equal Protection Clauses, the court employed the strict
scrutiny analysis and determined that the state did not have a compelling
state interest justifying such a violation.40

33. Aliessa v. Whalen, 694 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (Sup. Ct. 1999), rev’d sub nom., Aliessa v.
Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085. For example, one immigrant suffered from end-stage renal disease,
which required kidney dialysis twice a week and numerous prescriptions. Id. Another immigrant
suffered from many chronic diseases including arthritis requiring medical attention and medication.
Id. Each plaintiff had similar severe health problems; each was denied Medicaid benefits based on
their immigration status. Id.
34. Id. at 311–14.
35. Id. at 314.
36. Id. at 311 (footnote omitted) (second alteration in original).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1088–89 (N.Y. 2001).
40. Aliessa v. Whalen, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 313–14.
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Only three days after the decision, however, the New York Appellate
Division decided a case directly on point with Aliessa.41 That case dealt
with food stamps under the New York Social Services Act section 95.42
The appellate court held that because New York had “enacted the statute
in direct response to a Federal supplemental appropriations bill . . . the
challenged classification should be evaluated, for equal protection
purposes, under a rational basis standard rather than the strict scrutiny
standard the [New York S]upreme [C]ourt had employed.”43 After this
holding, the Supreme Court of Manhattan granted reargument and
vacated its prior decision relating to the Equal Protection Clause
violation.44 It did not, however, disturb the holding regarding article
XVII, section 1 of the New York State Constitution.45
On appeal, the appellate division reversed, holding that section 122
violated neither article XVII, section 1 of the New York State
Constitution, nor the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and
New York Constitutions.46
C. The New York Court of Appeals’s Holding
On June 5, 2001, the New York Court of Appeals announced its
decision.47 In determining Aliessa, the court considered the article XVII,
section 1 and the equal protections claims. First, based on precedent, the
court found that the New York Legislature may not deny aid to those
whom it had previous classified as needy, and therefore, could not deny
state-funded benefits to the plaintiffs.48 Second, the court determined that
Congress could not authorize the states to violate the Equal Protection
Clause even in the name of immigration policy.49 Because the defendants
did not allege a compelling state interest to justify their racial
classifications, the court determined that section 122 violated the Equal
Protection Clauses of both the United States and New York
constitutions.50

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d at 1089.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1094–99.
Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This section focuses on the court’s analysis, breaking the opinion
down into two sections: 1) the court’s New York article XVII, section 1
constitutional analysis, and 2) the court’s Equal Protection Clause
analysis. This section first provides a brief discussion of the court’s
article XVII, section 1 analysis wherein it determined that the Social
Services Law section 122 violated the article’s mandate to aid the needy.
The court could have stopped with only this analysis to find section 122
unconstitutional; however, it went one step further and engaged in an
equal protection analysis. The majority of this section will focus on this
portion of the opinion as the court took on the issue of whether Congress
could authorize the states to violate the Equal Protection Clause and
discriminate against immigrants. Central to this question is whether
Congress can devolve its immigration powers to the states. This section
will also look at whether this analysis was necessary and whether the
court could or should have engaged in another analysis rather than taking
on the issue of whether Congress exceeded its powers in enacting
PRWORA. This section concludes that the court, in relying on the
Constitution and available precedent, was within its bounds and
rightfully looked to Congress’s authority to determine whether section
122 was unconstitutional.
A. A Constitutional Mandate to Help the Needy
The New York Court of Appeals faced immigrants in dire need of
ongoing medical attention, but who did not have the means to obtain that
attention. Prior to section 122, these immigrants, based on need, would
have received the necessary aid, but now they did not have access to
ongoing medical attention, a basic necessity of life.51 The court seized
this opportunity to reiterate the intent of article XVII. Their conclusion to
reverse the appellate division’s decision regarding the article XVII,
section 1 claim was correct on both legal and public policy grounds.
Although the State’s arguments were persuasive, the plaintiffs’
arguments were well grounded in New York precedent and constitutional
history, dictating the interpretation of article XVII, section 1. The
plaintiffs also offered sound policy arguments that overcame the State’s
defenses. Furthermore, a determination that section 122 did not violate
article XVII, section 1 would have rewritten the purpose and the intent of
the framers of the New York Constitution.

51. Id.
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1. Article XVII, section 1: an affirmative duty
On the heels of the Great Depression in 1938, the New York
Constitutional Congress adopted a constitutional mandate to support the
needy in New York.52 This mandate, in article XVII, section 1 reads:
The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions and in such
manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time
determine.53

The section took the decision regarding whether to support the needy
away from the legislature. In fact, the section dictated that supporting the
needy was no longer “a matter of legislative grace”; rather it is
specifically mandated by the New York Constitution.54 The legislative
history of the section illustrates the belief that “[s]tate aid to the needy
was . . . a fundamental part of the social contract.”55 In fact, a chairman
of the New York Constitutional Committee stated that “[h]ere are words
which set forth a definite policy of government, a concrete social
obligation which no court may ever misread.”56 The policy set forth was
to aid those individuals who must “look to society for the bare necessities
of life.”57 The constitution, therefore, placed an affirmative duty on the
legislature to support the needy and indigent. The question then facing
the Aliessa court was whether the plaintiffs were in fact “needy.”
2. Definition of needy and a requirement to aid those classified as needy
The New York Constitution placed upon the legislature the duty to
determine who was needy, which they had done. In fact, prior to the
enactment of section 122, the plaintiffs would have fit into the “needy”
category and would have allegedly qualified for state-funded Medicaid
benefits.58
Once the legislature has characterized a class of individuals as needy
and an individual has met the requirements for aid, the New York
Constitution prevents the legislature from refusing to aid them.59 Because
52. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1977).
53. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
54. Tucker, 371 N.E.2d at 451.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 452.
58. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d at 1088 (N.Y. 2001).
59. The New York Constitution “unequivocally prevents the Legislature from simply
refusing to aid those whom it has classified as needy. Such a definite constitutional mandate cannot
be ignored or easily evaded in either its letter or its spirit.” Tucker, 371 N.E.2d at 452; see also
Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 737, 739 (1976).
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the legislature had previously determined that individuals within the
jurisdiction of New York in the same situation as the plaintiffs were
needy, the state was required to provide the plaintiffs aid. The issue then
shifted to how much support the legislature must provide the plaintiffs.
3. Legislative discretion in setting the level of benefits for the needy
Although article XVII, section 1 has been interpreted as prohibiting
the legislature from denying support to those whom it had previously
classified as needy, it has also been interpreted to afford the legislature
wide “discretion [in] set[ting] levels of benefits for the needy.”60
Therefore, even though the legislature must provide for those whom it
has classified as needy, it can determine how much support to give them.
But Tucker v. Toia made clear that in setting the level of benefits, the
state may not refuse to aid the needy; therefore, the level must provide
those individuals with some form of aid.61
Furthermore, New York has held that the legislature, in setting the
level of benefits, cannot impose onerous requirements upon the needy
that have nothing to do with need. In Tucker, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a state requiring needy minors to obtain a final
disposition in support proceedings before they could obtain public
assistance contravened the spirit of article XVII, section 1.62 Because
these requirements were so onerous, the Tucker court determined that the
statute effectively denied the minors, whom the legislature had classified
as needy, the support mandated by the constitution.63
In Aliessa, the State argued that they had guaranteed the plaintiffs
some aid.64 Social Services Law section 122 provided the plaintiffs and
immigrants similarly situated with emergency care and safety net
assistance.65 However, the court correctly determined that this level has
nothing to do with need at all. Instead the government placed a five-year
time restriction on the benefits in an attempt to ensure that the
immigrants are self-sufficient.66 In this case, it appears that “[l]egitimate
financial need is no longer the criteria for receiving government
support,” but instead rests upon a time qualification.67 The court held this

60. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d at 1093.
61. See generally Tucker, 371 N.E.2d 449.
62. Id. at 449.
63. Id.
64. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d at 1093.
65. Id.
66. Kostas A. Poulakidas, Welfare Reform and Immigration: Attempting to Find a Domestic
Answer to a Global Problem, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 283, 306 (1998).
67. Id. at 304.
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to be true and agreed with the plaintiffs’ claim that ongoing care, the
kind that the plaintiffs were lacking, is “a species of aid distinct from
safety net assistance and emergency medical treatment.”68
The court was also persuaded by the policy arguments advanced by
the plaintiffs. They claimed that in many cases, as with diabetics, when
ongoing medical treatment is not available, they begin a cycle of
stability, deterioration, “emergency, recovery, stabilization, deterioration
and the onset of another emergency.”69 If ongoing medical treatment
were available, this cycle could be broken and medical costs would be
lowered.
Relying on these policy arguments as well as upon precedent and the
requirements inherent in article XVII, section 1, the court essentially
created a floor for medical benefits for the needy. The court reiterated the
requirement set forth in Tucker that need must be a factor for
determining or denying benefits and concluded that “section 122
violate[d] the letter and spirit of article XVII, [section] 1 by imposing on
the plaintiffs an overly burdensome eligibility condition having nothing
to do with need, depriving them of an entire category of otherwise
available basic necessity benefits.”70 The immigrants could do nothing to
change their situation or classification. Citizenship, therefore, could not
be used to determine need. The court also reigned in the legislature’s
wide discretion over the level of benefits for the needy by proscribing
that the basic needs of the indigent or those the legislature classifies as
needy must be met. An emergency medical assistance program in this
case was not enough.
B. Questioning the Authority of Congress: Did the New York Court of
Appeals Go Too Far?
After determining that section 122 was unconstitutional, as it
violated article XVII, section 1 of the New York Constitution, the court
could have concluded its analysis, but due to the federal preemption
defense raised by the state, the court went one step further.71 It took on
the equal protection issue and in so doing faced the question of whether
Congress could authorize the states to violate the Equal Protection
Clause—by allowing them to discriminate based on alienage—in the
name of immigration policy. The heart of the issue came down to
68. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d at 1093.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The State argued that federal law in the area of immigration is preemptive of state law.
Therefore, because the legislature enacted section 122 in direct response to Title IV, the court should
be preempted from striking it down as unconstitutional. Id. at 1093 n.12.
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whether Congress could devolve its plenary power over immigration to
the States—an issue on which the United States Supreme Court has not
directly ruled. Although New York was one of the first states72 to tackle
this issue, it unequivocally determined that Congress exceeded its power
when it effectively conferred upon the states discretion over national
immigration policy.
This section will review the court’s analysis and discuss the
consequences of the court’s decision. In so doing, this section will 1)
explore the consequences that would flow from a holding that Congress
could devolve its immigration powers; 2) examine why Congress cannot
devolve these powers based on both a) the reasons the court used in
holding that Congress could not devolve the powers and b) other
theoretical reasons inherent in the powers themselves that would not
allow devolution; and 3) other options available to the Aliessa court.
1. Consequences flowing from a holding that Congress can devolve their
immigration and naturalization powers
As discussed previously, Title IV dictates that the states may not
provide state- or locally-funded benefits to aliens that do not meet the
specifications in 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (non-qualified aliens). Section 1621 of
the same Title does provide, though, that states may affirmatively
provide benefits to those individuals that would otherwise, under Title
IV, be ineligible by enacting laws or promulgating rules to support these
individuals.73 But Congress went one step further. In 8 U.S.C. § 1622,
Congress gave the states the power to discriminate based on alienage
under the veil of immigration policy.74
72. Arizona and Massachusetts have also been called to rule upon statutes enacted pursuant
to Title IV. See Kurti v. Maricopa County, 33 P.3d 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Doe v. Comm’r of
Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002). However, each case raised issues different
than Aliessa, and therefore, the courts distinguished Aliessa. Kurti, 33 P.3d at 503 n.5 (finding that
the statutes at issue did not mirror Title IV and therefore determining that it was “unnecessary to
decide what the appropriate standard of review would be if Arizona’s statutes did mirror the federal
law”); Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d at 414 (applying the rational basis review to
the statute at issue, which supplemented the federal medical benefits to aliens, but which contained
a six-month residency requirement because “the operative classification for equal protection
purposes in the setting of [the] case [was] not alienage, but residency”).
73. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
74. Section 1622(a) states that “a State is authorized to determine the eligibility for any State
public benefits of an alien . . . .” Id. § 1622(a). Under this framework, and limited only by a few
exceptions, a state could now deny state benefits to otherwise qualified aliens based solely upon their
classification as an alien. New York chose to adopt the federal classifications in its Social Services
Law section 122 determining that unqualified and many qualified aliens were ineligible to receive
state Medicaid. See supra Part II. Because this statute allows New York to treat these immigrants
differently than other states and differently than other individuals within the State of New York, the
plaintiffs claimed that section 122 denied them the equal protection secured by the United States and
New York Constitutions.
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As stated above, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
whether Congress may devolve their immigration and naturalization
powers. If this power could be delegated, there would be two primary
effects: 1) The states could violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and discriminate based on alienage because
Congress, when enacting statutes under its immigration power, can
discriminate and therefore, in an equal protection analysis, those statutes
are subject only to rational basis of review; this immunity from strict
scrutiny would be passed, with the immigration power, to the states; and
2) The immigration and naturalization policy would be inconsistent and
could possibly violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution.
a. The Equal Protection Clause and rational basis of review. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that “no state shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”75 This
provision forbids the government from treating individuals in like
situations differently. Furthermore, it is well established that “person”
includes lawfully admitted aliens in the United States.76 Therefore, the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the Aliessa plaintiffs from unequal
protection before the laws of any state within the United States. New
York has a similar provision guaranteeing persons in New York equal
protection before the laws of the state.77
Generally, when a court is presented with an equal protection claim,
it will defer to the legislature, unless the “state ‘classifications [are]
based on race or national origin and classifications affecting fundamental
rights.’”78 This deference is due largely to the fact that the judiciary feels
that policy decisions are best left to the legislature and the political
process.79 In these cases, the court will review the classification
searching only for a rational basis.80 However, when a state classification
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). On its face, this amendment applies only
to the states; however, the court has found that the federal government, although not bound by the
Fourteenth Amendment, has the same restriction placed upon them by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 18.1 (3d ed. 1999). Therefore, neither the states nor the federal government can deny any person
equal protection of the laws.
76. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371
(1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
77. It provides that “[n]o person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected
to any discrimination in his [or her] civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or
institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.” N.Y. CONST. art. I § 11.
78. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Clark
v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
79. See id.
80. Rational basis is the least restrictive standard of review. Under this test, the court will
largely defer to the legislature by asking “only whether it is conceivable that the classification bears
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affects a fundamental right or is based on race or national origin (which
are termed “suspect” bases), the court will review the classification with
strict scrutiny.81 This second category—suspect bases—is rooted in the
idea that an individual needs more protection because he or she is part of
a “discrete and insular” minority and would be excluded from the
ordinary policy process, which as stated above, normally serves to
remedy any injustice and which is the basis for deference to the
legislature in equal protection claims.82
A third level of review is the intermediate test, wherein the court will
still give some deference to the legislature.83 The Supreme Court has
used this standard for gender classifications and illegitimacy
classifications.84
The courts have applied each level of review in reviewing
classifications based on alienage. In determining which level of review to
apply, the courts have created three categories of alienage
a rational relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the constitution.” Id. So at
a minimum, the classification must be rationally related to “a legitimate governmental purpose.”
Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. The court will usually employ this test when the classification relates to
general economic legislation. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 75, §18.3. This test is also applied to
classifications used for “welfare benefits, property use, or business or personal activity that does not
involve a fundamental right.” Id.
81. A court will intervene and strictly scrutinize a classification when based on race or
national origin or other classifications that affect fundamental rights, and thereby override the
democratic process, because it believes that it “is able to assess [the] issues in a manner superior to,
or at least different from, the determination of the legislature.” Id. Under strict scrutiny review, the
legislature must show that it was “pursuing a ‘compelling’ or ‘overriding’ end,” rather than merely
showing that a rational relationship existed between the classification and the government’s
objective. Id.
82. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938); ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 75, § 18.3. Most cases involving classifications based on race, ethnic origins, or
age are reviewed under strict scrutiny and the government is required to show a compelling interest.
This is true even for classifications based on alienage because aliens fit into the “any person” text of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (the Fourteenth
Amendment, including the Equal Protection Clause is “universal in [its] application to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction [of the United States] without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality”); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1949) (reaffirming
Yick Wo by invalidating a California statute that prohibited the issuance of commercial fishing
licenses based on citizenship); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (reaffirming that the
Equal Protection Clause applies to aliens living legally in the United States by invalidating laws in
both Pennsylvania and Arizona using a strict scrutiny standard of review because the laws were
based on alienage and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause). In fact, the Supreme Court
has stated that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for
whom . . . [a] heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (internal
citation omitted).
83. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 75, § 18.3. Under this standard the court “will not
uphold a classification unless [it] find[s] that the classification has a ‘substantial relationship’ to an
‘important’ government interest.” Id. Although the court does not generally grant wide deference to
Congress under this level of review, it does grant more deference than the under strict scrutiny
standard.
84. Id.
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classifications.85 The first category deals with states that classify
individuals based on their citizenship for distributing economic benefits
or restricting their ability to participate in the economy.86 This category
of classification is subject to strict scrutiny, which the state will have a
difficult time overcoming.87 The second category again involves the
states, but this category covers classifications based on “allocating power
or positions in the political process.”88 These classifications are generally
subject to only rational basis of review and will usually survive due to
the state’s legitimate interest.89
The third category includes alienage classifications created by
federal law, which are subject only to rational basis review when they are
enacted under Congress’s immigration and naturalization power.90 In
Mathews v. Diaz, for instance, a unanimous Court found that Congress
could restrict welfare benefits based on alienage.91The Mathews Court
emphasized the importance of the immigration power:
Any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous polices in regard to the conduct of foreign relations,
the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of
government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry
or interference.92

Because the federal government enacted the statute at issue in Mathews,
the Court held that they could classify based on alienage. The Court
stated that it was “not ‘political hypocrisy’ to recognize that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially
different from the constitutional provision applicable to the federal

85. See supra note 82.
86. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 75, § 18.12; see also Graham, 403 U.S. at 375.
87. Id. These types of classifications are usually held invalid because it is almost impossible
for a state to show a “compelling state interest” justifying the classification. Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 85 (1976) (“Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if any, basis for
treating persons who are citizens of another State differently from persons who are citizens of
another country. Both groups are noncitizens as far as the State’s interests in administering its
welfare programs are concerned.”). However, this logic does not always apply to Congress.
88. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 75, § 18.12.
89. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (the state can discriminate based on alienage
for state troopers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (states can discriminate based on
alienage for public school teachers); see also, ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 75, § 18.12.
90. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 75, § 18.12. Indeed, the PRWORA provisions of Title
IV have been upheld when challenged based largely on the fact that they are federal laws enacted
under Congress’s immigration and naturalization powers and are, therefore, subject only to a rational
basis of review. See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001); City of Chicago v. Shalala,
189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 81 n.17 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952)).
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power over immigration and naturalization.”93 Furthermore, the Court
held that the statute would only be subject to a rational basis of review.
Therefore, when the federal government discriminates based on alienage
under their immigration and naturalization power, they are only subject
to rational basis review, which translates into giving great deference to
the legislaturel.94 In fact, these classifications will usually be upheld
unless they are found to be “arbitrary and invidious classification[s]
designed only to burden a disfavored group of persons.”95 However, as
stated above, this is not true of the states.
Therefore, if Congress were able to devolve their immigration and
naturalization powers to the states, then naturally the judicial deference
of rational basis review would be devolved as well and the states could
discriminate based on alienage.
The Aliessa case came down to which standard of review to apply
and this question hinged solely upon whether Congress could devolve its
immigration power (and virtual immunity from judicial review) to the
states thereby authorizing them to violate the Equal Protection Clause. If
Congress cannot devolve this power, then New York’s Social Services
Law section 122 would fall under the first category of alienage
classifications and be subject to strict scrutiny. But if they could devolve
this power, then the states would only be subject to the rational basis test
when enacting laws in furtherance of that power.96
93. Id. at 86–87. The court further stated:
[A] division by a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into
subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a
comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate
part of its business. Furthermore, whereas the Constitution inhibits every State’s power to
restrict travel across its own borders, Congress is explicitly empowered to exercise that
type of control over travel across the borders of the United States.
Id. at 85.
94. The rationale for the different standards and for holding federal laws only to rational
basis of review is that “at the federal level, equal protection norms must be balanced against the
deference traditionally accorded to exercises of the federal immigration power, in light of the foreign
affairs implications of immigration lawmaking.” Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protectionism, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
493, 496 (2001).
95. Id.
96. As intimated in Graham v. Richardson, however, it must be reiterated that Congress may
be able to require a state to discriminate based on alienage, if it requires the states to do so
uniformly. 403 U.S. 365, 383 n.14 (1971) (“We have no occasion to decide whether Congress, in the
exercise of the immigration and naturalization power, could itself enact a statute imposing on aliens
a uniform nationwide residency requirement as a condition of federally funded welfare benefits.”).
In fact, the Graham Court did state that if the federal statute, enacted pursuant to Congress’s
immigration powers “were to be read so as to authorize discriminatory treatment of aliens at the
option of the States, Takahashi demonstrates that serious constitutional questions [would be]
presented.” Id. at 382. The Court went on to state that “[a]lthough the Federal Government
admittedly has broad constitutional power to determine what aliens shall be admitted to the United
States, the period they may remain, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization, Congress
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b. Inconsistent immigration policy. Congress is given charge to
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”97 and to “establish an [sic]
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”98 The absolute power over immigration
and naturalization was invested in the federal government from the birth
of the nation. But with that power came the requirement that the rule and
therefore the use of the power be for attaining a uniform rule or policy.
Naturally, if the states were given the discretion to discriminate based on
alienage, there could not be a uniform immigration policy.
Furthermore, because each state would be given wide discretion over
the methods by which they will discriminate based on alienage, under the
guise of immigration power, the privileges and immunities clause99 may
be implicated, especially if the statutes employed durational residency
requirements, which normally have been found unconstitutional based on
the “fundamental right to travel freely as guaranteed by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution.”100 These
possible problems relating to inconsistent immigration policies and
privileges and immunities problems also create limitations to the ability
to devolve the immigration powers and are discussed in the next section.

does not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”
Id. However that was not the issue in Aliessa, where PRWORA authorized the states to adopt
divergent policies.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
98. Id. cl. 4.
99. Id. art. IV, § 2.
100. Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Mass. 2002) (citing
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 509–10 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
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2. Limitations on the delegation of immigration and naturalization
powers101
Although it is not expressly granted in the Constitution, the power to
regulate immigration has also been deemed to be solely delegated to the
federal government.102 There are four main sources from which this
power is derived, three constitutional sources and one extraconstitutional source. These sources are the “Naturalization Clause, the
Foreign Affairs Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the extraconstitutional theory of inherent sovereignty.”103 These sources and their
histories illustrate that the immigration power has been delegated almost
exclusively to the federal government, which leads to the conclusion that
the power is exclusively national and therefore not delegable.104 The
New York Court of Appeals relied on the Naturalization Clause and its
uniformity requirement to reach its conclusion; however, any of the
sources would have led to the same conclusion. Since the court of
appeals focused on one constitutional argument, this note will focus on
that argument, but will also discuss the possibility of the same result

101. Since the New Deal Era, it has been accepted that Congress can delegate some of its
regulatory powers to agencies and other branches of the federal government. Sarah Zellmer, The
Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 942–43 (2000). In fact, this delegation of powers, originally seen as a
“constitutional offense under the nondelegation principle of separation of powers,” is now generally
recognized as promoting efficiency. Id. at 942. Although the nondelegation issue has recently
resurfaced, the Supreme Court laid it again to rest in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns Inc. 531
U.S. 457, 473 (2001), where the Court overruled a lower court holding that Congress delegated too
much authority to the Environmental Protection Agency. The Court reiterated the constitutionality of
Congress’s ability to delegate some of its regulatory powers as long as they do not delegate their
legislative powers. Id.
But Aliessa dealt with Congressional delegation to a state, not merely to an administrative agency,
which takes it out of the nondelegation arena. Furthermore, Congress was delegating its immigration
and naturalization policymaking powers not merely its regulatory powers. The Supreme Court has
not had the opportunity to determine whether the immigration power is capable of being devolved.
In fact, it has not had a chance even to “evaluate what government powers, if any are exclusively
national,” and therefore not transferable. If the immigration power is exclusively national, Congress
could not devolve it to the states. The question, therefore, comes down to whether the immigration
power is exclusively national.
102. Barbara A. Arnold, The New Leviathan: Can the Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
Really Transfer Federal Power Over Public Benefits to State Governments?, 21 MD. J. INT’L. L. &
TRADE 225, 232 (1997).
103. Wishnie, supra note 94, at 532 (footnotes omitted); see also Aliessa v. Novello, 754
N.E.2d 1085, 1095–96 (2001). For a thorough discussion of all four possible sources of the
immigration and naturalization powers, see Wishnie, supra note 94, at 532–52.
104. But see Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage
Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357 (2002), and Peter J. Spiro, Learning
to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997).
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through the other arguments, both constitutionally based and extraconstitutionally based.105
a. Power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. The United
States Constitution provides that Congress has power to “establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”106 This power is plenary and the
Supreme Court has stated “over no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete.”107 But can Congress devolve this
power? The Aliessa court focused on this constitutional grant of power in
its analysis, but it primarily focused on the word “uniform.” In fact, “the
textual requirement that there be a single naturalization rule that is
‘uniform . . . throughout the United States’ long has been understood to
establish an exclusively federal power, on which states may neither
exercise nor impede.”108 To get to this same result, the Aliessa court
relied on precedent and analyzed the type of power the PRWORA was
authorizing New York to use.
Normally Congress can direct the states to implement national
immigration objectives, which may even entail the states discriminating
based on alienage. The Supreme Court has determined that “when
Federal welfare programs are jointly administered with the States,
Congress may direct the States to implement national immigration
objectives as long as the ‘Federal Government has by uniform rule
prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment
of an alien subclass.’”109 With this power, it appears that the portion of
Title IV requiring the States to withhold federal benefits from different
classes of aliens is within the immigration power of Congress. However,
Title IV went one step further. It expressly gave the states power to
create their own policy when it came to state-funded welfare benefits and
even authorized the states to base eligibility upon U.S. citizenship.110
New York took Congress’s initiative and after enacting section 122,
began to discriminate against legal aliens by requiring otherwise eligible

105. See Wishnie, supra note 94, at 532–52 (discussing the immigration power as an exclusive
power stemming from the Foreign Affairs Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause). These last
three sections are drawn heavily and exclusively from Wishnie. Id.
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. For a detailed and thoughtful discussion regarding why the
naturalization powers are nondevolvable, see id. at 532–37.
107. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1096 (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
108. Wishnie, supra note 94, at 533; see also Michael T. Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization
Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 1007, 1025 (1976).
109. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1096 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219
n.19 (1982)); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
110. See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2000).
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aliens to wait five years to be eligible for state medical assistance.111 The
Aliessa court held this grant of power to be outside Congress’s power.
In making this determination, the court relied heavily on Graham v.
Richardson. In Graham, the Supreme Court determined that a state law
that discriminated based on alienage was unconstitutional under a strict
scrutiny review.112 The Court also discussed Congress’s wide discretion
over immigration policy. However, it alluded to the notion that Congress
could not delegate those same powers to the states.113 In fact, it stated
that “Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual States
to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”114 The Graham Court also stated
that a “Federal statute authorizing ‘discriminatory treatment of aliens at
the option of States’ would present ‘serious constitutional questions.’”115
Furthermore, Graham held that allowing Congress to authorize states
“to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for
federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene [the]
explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”116 Applying Graham
directly to the Aliessa facts, the New York Court of Appeals found that
“in administering their own programs, the States are free to discriminate
in either direction [to withhold Medicaid or grant it]—producing not
uniformity, but potentially wide variation based on localized or
idiosyncratic concepts of largesse, economics and politics.”117
Relying upon Graham and the inherent exclusivity of the power
granted by the Naturalization Clause compounded with its uniformity
requirement, the court correctly decided that Congress could not transfer
its immigration and naturalization power to the state. Because the court
correctly determined that Congress could not transfer this power to the
state, subjecting section 122 to strict scrutiny was also appropriate.
But perhaps Congress foresaw this problem. In 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7),
Congress plainly stated that the problems Title IV was created to resolve
were “compelling government interest[s].” With a compelling
government interest, the states should be able to justify their
classifications under strict scrutiny; however, the uniformity issue would
still be lurking and as the Supreme Court states in dicta in Graham,
“Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual States to

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See N.Y. Social Services Law § 122(1)(b)(ii) (Consol. 2001).
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Id. at 382.
Id.
Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1097 (N.Y. 2001).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971).
Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d at 1098.
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violate the Equal Protection Clause,”118 even by supplying them with a
compelling interest.
Another possible pitfall in the Aliessa court’s analysis is that it did
not consider what the term uniformity means. Uniformity could be
interpreted in one of two ways. In the tax arena, the Supreme Court has
held uniformity to equate to geographic uniformity, which requires
uniformity of laws throughout the nation.119 Uniformity could also be
construed to require “only uniform federal incorporation of divergent
state rules,” which interpretation the Supreme Court has applied in the
context of bankruptcy.120 But federal power over bankruptcy is
concurrent with the states, not exclusive. Therefore, if the Aliessa court
relied on the precedent construing the Naturalization Clause to equate to
geographic uniformity, similar to the interpretation of uniformity in the
tax arena, then they again made the correct decision.121
Overall, even though the Supreme Court has not spoken on the exact
issue presented to the Aliessa court, the New York Court of Appeals
correctly relied on available precedent, which, when applied to the facts,
appeared to be in line with the Supreme Court’s lead.122
b. Other potential arguments also prohibiting the devolution of
naturalization and immigration powers. Although the Aliessa court relied
on the naturalization powers to determine that in enacting PRWORA
Congress exceeded its constitutional powers, there are other theories that
the court could have relied on and which would have provided the same
result.
(1)
Constitutionally-based prohibitions:123 The Foreign Affairs
Clauses and the Foreign Commerce Clause.124 The Foreign Affairs
Clauses include the following grants of power to the legislature and the
federal government (the President): 1) “To define and punish piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of

118. Graham, 403 U.S. at 382 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)).
119. Collins, supra note 13, at 239.
120. Id. In the bankruptcy arena the court has “reasoned that the Federal bankruptcy statute
incorporated divergent state law in a uniform manner, and therefore, ‘[t]he general operation of the
law is uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in different states.’” Wishnie,
supra note 94, at 536 (alteration in original) (citing Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181,
190 (1902)).
121. Id. at 535–37.
122. For another discussion on the problems stemming from a lack of uniformity that may
accompany immigration law devolution, see Victor C. Romero, Devolution and Discrimination, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377 (2002).
123. This section will only give a brief overview of these two clauses because these two grants
of immigration and naturalization powers are thoroughly discussed in Wishnie’s article. See supra
note 94. Further, this discussion is drawn heavily from Wishnie’s article as well.
124. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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nations”; 125 2) “To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures on the land and water”;126 and 3) the
President “shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treatises . . . , and by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers . . . .”127
Professor Wishnie,128 argues that the history of the interpretation of these
sections, combined with the constitutional prohibition on the states that
“no State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
letters of Marque and Reprisal,”129 makes clear that the foreign affairs
powers are, in almost all cases, exclusively within the realm of the
federal government.130 There have been arguments that the Compact
Clause131 grants the states some authority in the foreign affairs realm;
however, Wishnie points out that even with this power, it is only a
“limited, conditional grant of foreign affairs power to the states . . .
that . . . represents a small portion of the foreign affairs powers expressly
contemplated by the constitutional text, and an even smaller portion of
those now understood to comprise the foreign affairs powers of the
modern nation.”132 Wishnie concludes that “if the immigration power
arises from the Foreign Affairs Clauses, then it may be exercised
exclusively by the federal government and may not be devolved to the
states.”133
The foreign commerce clause grants the legislature the authority to
“regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes.”134 Wishnie also discusses the devolvability of
the immigration powers through this grant of foreign powers to
Congress.135 He notes that at first glance, the Foreign Commerce Clause
could be interpreted similar to the Interstate Commerce Clause, which
was a grant of concurrent jurisdiction over commerce between the
federal government and the states.136 However, Wishnie rejects that
argument and explains that the Court, in looking at this clause, has found
that its grant of authority to Congress is an “‘exclusive and absolute’

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10.
Id. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id. art II, § 2, cl. 2
Assistant Professor of Clinical Law, New York University.
Wishnie, supra note 94, at 540 (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1).
Id. at 537-44. But see Chang, supra note 104.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
Wishnie, supra note 94, at 543.
Id. at 544.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
Wishnie, supra note 94, at 544-48.
Id. at 544-45.
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power over foreign commerce.”137 He also establishes possible avenues
wherein the states could possibly share this power with the federal
government; however, he concludes that the power is not devolvable:
Yet there are reasons to conclude that Congress may not devolve its
power to regulate foreign commerce to the states, nor any immigration
power that may arise from it. Certainly any argument for devolvability
would contradict the Court’s longstanding conviction that the foreign
commerce power is the “exclusive and absolute” domain of the federal
government. The argument also would contradict the more modern
characterization of the power to regulate foreign commerce as merely
an aspect of the broad power to regulate foreign affairs, the devolution
of which, as discussed above, should not be tolerated. Finally, it is
noteworthy that even opponents of “dormant foreign commerce
preemption” have not suggested that states possess an independent
power to regulate foreign commerce; theirs is the narrower claim that a
state’s otherwise constitutional regulation of all commerce should not
be invalidated simply because the regulation also applies to
138
international commerce.

Therefore, the Aliessa court could have also used either of these two
arguments to support its conclusion that the federal immigration powers
are not devolvable to the states, and therefore, Congress went beyond its
grant of powers in enacting PRWORA by granting the states the ability
to discriminate based on alienage.
(2) Extra-constitutionally-based prohibition: Inherent authority. The
New York Court of Appeals chose to rely solely on one constitutional
argument to reason that Congress could not devolve its immigration
power. Because of the success of this argument, the court did not need to
rely on the other available constitutional possibilities, the foreign
commerce clause or the foreign affairs clauses. But the court also
bypassed the fourth argument, which is grounded in extra-constitutional
theory and case law: the inherent sovereign power.
This theory of Congress’s supreme and plenary power in the area of
immigration policy and legislation was expounded in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.139 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court
determined that the source of foreign policy power is inherent in the
sovereign power of the nation.140 In fact, relating to the redistribution of
powers between the federal government and the states, Justice Sutherland

137. Id. at 546 (citing Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904); Bowman v. Chi. &
Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888)).
138. Wishnie, supra note 94, at 548.
139. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
140. Arnold, supra note 102, at 234.
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stated that “the states severally never possessed international powers.”141
A limitation applies to this type of power. It can only be transferred from
one sovereign to another sovereign.142 Therefore, Congress acting on
behalf of the nation could not transfer these inherent powers to the nonsovereign states.143 To do so “would be to tear it from its source.”144
Therefore, although Congress has virtually unlimited power in this area,
it cannot devolve those powers to the states. Using this theory, the New
York Court of Appeals could have reached the same conclusion that
Congress could not devolve its immigration power to New York or any
state in the union.
3. Other options available to the Aliessa court
The Aliessa court appears to have gone out of its way to address the
Equal Protection Clause in light of PRWORA. In doing so, they arrived
at the result that section 122 should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
However, they may have been able to avoid this entire discussion and
still found section 122 unconstitutional under a rational basis of review
because the Supreme Court, using rational basis review, has held some
statutes unconstitutional that have been “blatantly prejudicial against a
vulnerable group.”145
Determining a statute unconstitutional under the rational basis of
review is also possible where the right denied to a minority group is an
important right.146 In its opinion, the Aliessa court quoted the Supreme
Court characterizing “ongoing medical care as a ‘basic necessity of
life.’”147 In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court declared that a Texas
statute that “authorized school districts to deny admission” to alien
children was unconstitutional.148 In that decision, the court determined
that even though education is not a constitutional right it was an
important right.149 Under this same reasoning, the court could have
chosen not to take the road not traveled to determine whether Congress
may authorize a state to discriminate against aliens, and instead

141. Wishnie, supra note 94, at 550 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316) (citation
omitted).
142. Id. at 552.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Stacy Sulman Kahana, Crossing the Border of Plenary Power: The Viability of an Equal
Protection Challenge to Title IV of the Welfare Law, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1421, 1432 (1997).
146. Id. at 1433.
147. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted).
148. Kahana, supra, note 145, at 1433.
149. Id.
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employed the rational basis of review and focus on the “important” right
that section 122 denied rather than who authorized New York to deny it.
V. CONCLUSION
Faced with a difficult choice the New York Court of Appeals
correctly decided to take on the issue to determine whether Congress
could devolve its immigration powers to the states. Although the Federal
Court of Appeals in two circuits have discussed the constitutionality of
the PRWORA and even Title IV, they had only looked at Congress’s
powers to enact the act. They had not touched upon the issue of whether
Congress could empower the states to discriminate against aliens. In this
manner, the New York Court of Appeals took on a new issue. Many have
applauded its holding. In fact, New York Governor Pataki said that they
would not appeal this decision to the Supreme Court. Pataki also stated
that New York would change the laws to reflect the court’s holding.
The question now is whether other states that have adopted the
federal classifications from Title IV into their state welfare benefits plans
will follow suit after New York. This remains unclear. However,
recently, an Arizona Court of Appeals discussed this issue, and although
the facts did not require the state to determine whether Congress could
devolve its power to the states, it did state that “such congressional
authorization cannot excuse states from compliance with the mandates of
equal protection.”150 Perhaps the tide is turning. Whether other states will
adopt the New York Court of Appeals’s reasoning or whether Title IV is
eventually amended, based on precedent, the Aliessa court did correctly
decide the issue at hand.
Karin H. Berg

150. Kurti v. Maricopa County, 33 P.3d 499, 505 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); see also Doe v.
Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002) (distinguishing Aliessa because
the Massachusetts statutes only supplemented the federal medical benefits and only discriminated
between aliens, not citizens and aliens; therefore, “the operative classification for equal protection
purposes in the setting of [the] case [was] not alienage, but residency”).

